Infinitary tableau for semantic truth by Meadows, Toby
THE REVIEW OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC
Volume 8, Number 2, June 2015
INFINITARY TABLEAU FOR SEMANTIC TRUTH
TOBY MEADOWS
Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen
Abstract. We provide infinitary proof theories for three common semantic theories of truth:
strong Kleene, van Fraassen supervaluation and Cantini supervaluation. The value of these systems
is that they provide an easy method of proving simple facts about semantic theories. Moreover
we shall show that they also give us a simpler understanding of the computational complexity of
these definitions and provide a direct proof that the closure ordinal for Kripke’s definition is ωC K1 .
This work can be understood as an effort to provide a proof-theoretic counterpart to Welch’s game-
theoretic (Welch, 2009).
§1. Introduction. In Kripke (1975), Kripke introduced fixed point theories of truth
to the philosophy of language. The definitions of these truth predicates are conducted
using transfinite recursion and the theory of inductive definitions. While such theories
are well understood in mathematical logic (Moschovakis, 1974), the resultant definitions
are complicated both in terms of heuristics and computation. Proofs about membership in
these fixed points are conducted informally in the metalanguage and are often contingent
on a series of lemmas establishing various properties about the fixed point in question.
This sort of reasoning is analogous to the way one may reason about a modal logic using
its semantics. With modal logic, however, we usually also have a proof theory which,
having established soundness and completeness, allows us to establish claims in a simple
and transparent manner.
The aim of this paper is to provide a similarly simple and transparent means of verifying
simple claims about the extension of the truth predicate. To do this we shall make use
of infinitary tableau systems. We shall then establish that each of the systems provided is
sound and complete with respect to their associated fixed points. The paper is broken into
a section for each of the tableau systems developed. After this, we prove that each system
gives a 11-complete set as its intended extension and provide a direct proof showing that
the height of the fixed point is ωC K1 .
1.1. Semantic theories of truth. In this section, we define each of the fixed point
truth definitions used in this paper, although we shall assume some familiarity with the
basic construction (Kripke, 1975). We restrict ourselves to providing a truth definition
for the standard model of arithmetic, N and we assume that we are in the language LT
of arithmetic expanded with a predicate T intended to represent truth. The language of
arithmetic will be denoted as L. Let SentL and SentLT denote the sentences of L and LT
respectively. We assume that we have a recursive bijection · : SentLT ∼= ω. We use
ϕ,ψ, χ as variables for sentences from SentLT in the metalanguage.
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1.1.1. Strong Kleene. Let  stand for a pair of sets of sentences 〈+,−〉 which we
shall call the extension and anti-extension respectively. These pairs will play the role of
guesses or approximations of the truth predicate’s intended meaning. We let AAtom stand
for a recursive predicate which is satisfied by arithmetic atomic sentences. Let AArith
be a recursive predicate which is satisfied by true arithmetic atomic sentences. We shall
write ψx (n) to mean the sentence obtained by substituting the numeral n (which represents
n ∈ ω) for the variable x in the formula ψ . In most cases, we shall suppress the x as this
should result in no confusion.
DEFINITION 1.1. We define the partial function V al : (P(SentLT ) × P(SentLT )) ×
SentLT ⇁ 2 by recursion on the complexity of sentences as follows:1
V al(ϕ) = 1 iff (ϕ ∈ AAtom ∧ ϕ ∈ AArith) ∨(
ϕ := T ψ ∧ ψ ∈ +) ∨
(ϕ := (¬ψ) ∧ V al(ψ) = 0) ∨
(ϕ := (ψ ∧ χ) ∧ V al(ψ) = 1 ∧ V al(χ) = 1) ∨(
ϕ := (∀xψ) ∧ ∀n ∈ ω V al(ψx (n)) = 1
))
V al(ϕ) = 0 iff (ϕ ∈ AAtom ∧ ϕ /∈ AArith) ∨(
ϕ := T ψ ∧ ψ ∈ −) ∨
(ϕ := (¬ψ) ∧ V al(ψ) = 1) ∨
(ϕ := (ψ ∧ χ) ∧ (V al(ψ) = 0 ∨ V al(χ) = 0) ∨(
ϕ := (∀xψ) ∧ ∃n ∈ ω V al(ψx (n)) = 0
))
Informally speaking, this function takes a guess and a sentence and gives us the semantic
value of that sentence according to that particular guess. Note that the function defined
above is not total. For example, suppose  = 〈∅,∅〉 and consider the sentence T 0 = 1.
Since 0 = 1 is in neither the extension nor the anti-extension, V al(T 0 = 1) is not
defined.
We now define the so-called jump function which provides the inductive engine behind
the definition.
DEFINITION 1.2. Let jsK : P(SentLT ) × P(SentLT ) → P(SentLT ) × P(SentLT ) be
such that
jsK () = 〈{ϕ | V al(ϕ) = 1} , {ϕ | V al(ϕ) = 0}〉
Intuitively, jsK takes one guess at the extension and anti-extension of the truth predicate
and returns the set of sentences which would be evaluated as true according to that guess.
For example, if 1 = 0 was in , then T 1 = 0 would be in jsK (). We shall say that a
set  is sound if  ⊆ jsK ().
1 We shall be somewhat sloppy in the metalanguage. For example, we are using the symbol ‘∧′
in both the object language and the metalanguage. In an effort to avoid confusion, we shall use
parentheses for emphasis. Thus we write ϕ := (¬ψ) to indicate that the sentence denoted by ϕ is
identical to that denoted by ¬ψ .
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DEFINITION 1.3. We define the intended interpretation, 	sK for the truth predicate by
transfinite recursion:
	0 := 〈∅,∅〉
	α+1 := jsK (	α)
	β :=
〈⋃
α<β
	+α ,
⋃
α<β
	−α
〉
for limit β
Let 	sK := 	α for the least α such that 	α = 	α+1.
We are guaranteed that a fixed point will exist because it can be shown that the jump
function is monotonic (Burgess, 1986; Moschovakis, 1974). Moreover, we should note
that other, larger fixed points can be defined by starting with a different (although sound in
the sense defined above) set at the base of the construction. The definition we offer here is
known as the minimal fixed point and it is the only one that we shall be concerned with in
this paper.
1.1.2. Supervaluation. We now define the supervaluational truth definitions which em-
ploy the van Fraassen scheme and Cantini schemes. We shall now only consider classical
interpretations for the truth predicate for which each  = 〈+,−〉 is such that + ∪
− = SentLT and + ∩ − = ∅ (Burgess, 1986). For ease of notation, we now let 
stand for subsets of SentLT , thus leaving out the now redundant anti-extension. We let¬˙ = {(¬ϕ) | ϕ ∈ }.
DEFINITION 1.4.  is a vF-expansion of , abbreviated  vF  if  ⊇  and
 ∩ ¬˙ = ∅.
We now define a new jump function jvF which exploits the notion of an expansion.
Informally speaking, we are admitting sentences into the extension of the truth predicate if
every safe (in a way which will soon be described) expansion of the current guess agrees
on that sentence. With the van Fraassen expansion, we ensure that we only consider alter-
native truth extensions that both expand upon what we already know but do not contradict
anything we have already learnt. Once again, it takes one guess and returns another which
is intended to be an improvement.
DEFINITION 1.5. Let jvF : P(SentLT ) → P(SentLT ) be such that
jvF () = {ϕ | ∀ vF  V al(ϕ) = 1}.
Our intended extension of the truth predicate is then defined in much the same way as the
strong Kleene definition.
DEFINITION 1.6.
	0 := ∅
	α+1 := jvF (	α)
	β :=
⋃
α∈β
	α for limit β
Finally, let 	vF be 	α for the first α such that 	α+1 = 	α .
Once again, the jump function is monotonic, so we are guaranteed that there is a fixed
point. 	vF then forms the intended extension of the truth predicate in our standard model.
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The Cantini evaluation scheme is defined in a similar fashion; the difference is that we
use what we call a Ca-expansion as opposed to a vF-expansion. It is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 1.7.  is a Ca-expansion, abbreviated  Ca  of  if  ⊇  and for all
ϕ it is not the case that ϕ ∈  and (¬ϕ) ∈ .
Informally speaking, we only consider expansions which agree with what we already know
and in addition to this are consistent, in the sense of not containing any sentence and its
negation. The rest of the definition is the same as for van Fraassen supervaluation, except
we use Ca-expansions rather than vF-expansions. The monotonicity results still hold and
we let 	Ca be the least fixed point of the resultant definition (Cantini, 1990). We observe
that none of the definitions are equivalent. Indeed, we have
	sK  	vF  	Ca .
To see that 	vF  	sK , let λ be a liar sentence such that λ ↔ ¬T λ. We observe that
¬(T λ∧¬T λ) is in 	vF but not in 	sK . The reason is that for any sentence (including
λ) every classical interpretation will be such that λ is either in the extension or not. But on
the other hand, there is no point in the strong Kleene induction at which ¬(T λ∧¬T λ)
could get into the extension of the truth predicate 	sK .2 To see that 	Ca  	vF , consider
the sentence ψ := ¬(T λ ∧ T ¬λ). We have ψ ∈ 	Ca but ψ /∈ 	vF . We demonstrate
this in Examples 3.5 and 4.1. We leave the inclusions as an exercise for the reader. The
reasoning here is informal and too brief. There are a number of other claims that should
be established before we reason so informally. This is part of the problem with reasoning
directly with the semantic definition. We shall see that simple proofs of these claims can
easily be established with the tableau systems offered below.
§2. Strong Kleene. We are now ready to provide the framework for the tableau sys-
tems. We commence by providing an alternative, more fine-grained definition of the min-
imal strong Kleene fixed point. This definition can be found in (Halbach, 2011, p. 202)
and will be easier to work with. In contrast to the previous approach, we now treat the truth
predicate more like one of the other logical connectives. We thus abandon the V al function
and define a jump function hsK which does all the work for all the connectives (including
truth) at once.
2.1. A finer-grained definition. Our revised jump function is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 2.1. Let hsK : P(SentLT ) → P(SentLT ) be such that χ ∈ hsK () iff:
• χ ∈ ;
• χ ∈ AAtom and χ ∈ AArith;
• there is some ϕ such that χ = ¬ϕ, ϕ ∈ AAtom and ϕ /∈ AArith;
• there is some ϕ such that χ = ¬¬ϕ and ϕ ∈ ;
• there are ϕ,ψ such that χ = ϕ ∧ ψ and both ϕ ∈  and ψ ∈ ;
• there are ϕ,ψ such that χ = ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) and either (¬ϕ) ∈  or (¬ψ) ∈ ;
• there is some ϕ such that χ = ∀xϕ and for all n ∈ ω, ϕ(n) ∈ ;
• there is some ϕ such that χ = ¬∀xϕ and there is some n ∈ ω such that
(¬ϕ(n)) ∈ ;
• there is some ϕ such that χ = T ϕ and ϕ ∈ ; or
• there is some ϕ such that χ = ¬T ϕ and (¬ϕ) ∈ .
2 We shall see this more clearly later, once the tableau system is in place.
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We might see this definition as a generalisation of our ordinary satisfaction definition, in
that it is expanded to incorporate a truth predicate. Then we define our intended interpre-
tation of the truth predicate using an inductive definition. Also note that we have made do
here with just an extension and not an extension/anti-extension pair. The negation clause
ensures that this suffices with fixed points.
DEFINITION 2.2. We define the intended extension sK by transfinite recursion as follows:
0 := ∅
α+1 := hsK (α)
β :=
⋃
α∈β
α for limit β.
Let sK be α for the least α such that α = α+1.
We can verify, by inspection, that this jump function is monotonic and thus that we are
justified in saying the recursion has a fixed point.
2.2. Tableau (sK ). We now define our first tableau system. Indeed, we can look to
the definition of the hsK to provide us with a guide as to how to do this. The tableau system
is intended to capture 	sK , the extension of the truth predicate in the least fixed point of the
three-valued strong Kleene evaluation scheme. The tableau is a tree consisting of sentences
fromLT as nodes. The system we use is much the same as can be found in Smullyan (1968)
or Priest (2008) except that we use an ω-rule to deal with the quantifiers. An example of a
similar tableau system can be found in Toledo (1975) although it is a trivial transformation
of the more common Tait calculus which can be seen in Pohlers (2009).
2.2.1. Starting the tableau. To test whether some χ is in 	, we start a tableau by
writing ¬χ . It will form the root of a tree which is constructed downwardly.
2.2.2. Rules. In completing the tableau, we must discharge our responsibilities to all
of the sentences in the tableau. The rules below tells us what sentences must be added to
the tableau in order to discharge those responsibilities.
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For the remainder of the paper, we shall assume that →, ∧, ↔ and ∃ have been defined
in the usual way; although we shall not mention them explicitly in definitions of proof
systems or fixed points. Rules can be provided for them using Smullyan (1968), Toledo
(1975), and Priest (2008).
Once we have discharged our responsibilities to a sentence, nothing more will be
done with that sentence. Note that there will be no finite stage in the construction
of a branch at which a ∀xϕ(x) will be fully discharged: an infinite branch is required for
this. We shall say that a sentence is discharged if either every rule that can be
applied to it has been applied or it is either an arithmetic atomic or negated arithmetic
atomic.
We shall say that a branch of a tableau for ¬ϕ is properly formed for ¬ϕ if every
sentence on the branch is either ¬ϕ or the result of a rule having been applied to a sentence
higher on the branch. A branch is properly formed if it is properly formed for some
sentence ψ .
PROPOSITION 2.3. The set of (finite) branches which are properly formed by the rules
is recursive.
2.2.3. Closing conditions. A branch in a tableau closes if either: a false arithmetic
atomic sentence occurs on the branch; or for some sentence ϕ ∈ L (i.e. not involving the
truth predicate) both ϕ and ¬ϕ occur on that branch.3 Once the branch is closed no further
sentences may be added to the branch. We say that a branch is open if it is fully discharged
and not closed.
If all of the branches in the tableau for ¬ϕ close, then ϕ is in the intended extension of
the truth predicate which we abbreviate sK ϕ.4
FACT 2.4. For arithmetic sentences χ ∈ L (i.e., not involving a truth predicate), sK χ
iff χ is true in the standard model of arithmetic (see Pohlers, 2009; Toledo, 1975).
Given this fact, we shall augment our closing conditions for the tableau by adding that a
branch also closes if a false arithmetic sentence occurs on that branch.
3 We note that if a sequent system were developed then this condition would correspond to a
restricted version of the reflexivity rule ϕ  ϕ.
4 Observe that we can reformulate the tableau system as a game, similar to that of Welch (2009).
Player I, Abe, wants to show that χ is in the extension of the truth predicates. Player II, Elly,
wants to show that it is not. Player Abe asks player Elly a series of questions which are designed
to show that this could not occur.
Player Abe commences by asking player Elly if ¬χ is the case. At stage n of the game, Abe
must query a sentence σ played previously by Elly. Elly must then respond by playing according
to the table below:
If σ is of the form then Elly must play
¬¬ϕ ϕ
ϕ ∧ ψ ϕ and ψ
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) either ¬ϕ or ¬ψ
If σ is of the form then Elly must play
∀xϕ(x) ϕ(n) for every term t
¬∀xϕ(x) ¬ϕ(t) for some n ∈ ω
Tϕ ϕ
¬Tϕ ¬ϕ
For the case of ∀xϕ(x), Elly must find a way of ensuring that she plays ϕ(t) for all terms by the
end of the game. She obviously cannot do it in one move. Abe wins the game if Elly ever ends up
either: having played both ϕ and ¬ϕ for some arithmetic sentence; or a false arithmetic atomic
sentence. Otherwise, Elly wins.
The tableau system can thus be understood as a means of tracking all of the different turns that
the game could have taken when a formula is of the form ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) or ¬∀xϕ(x).
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2.3. Examples.
EXAMPLE 2.5. sK T 1 = 1.
¬T 1 = 1
1 = 1
×
Let app : ω → ω be defined by primitive recursion in such a way that:
app(0) := 1 = 1
app(n + 1) := T app(n)
Since app is recursive, there is an arithmetic formula representing it. Rather than using
that formula we shall exploit Fact 2.4 and take it that the function does what it says it does.
We shall assume that the recursive function is adequately represented by an arithmetic
formula and that our proof theory will only leave open branches in which the correct output
occurs. Thus instead of including this working, we shall incorporate a rule which allows
us to substitute the correct value of recursive functions. The following example illustrates
this.
EXAMPLE 2.6. sK ∀n T app(n).
Let D(x, y) be the recursive diagonal predicate, which says that x is the code of a
formula with one free variable and y is the code of the sentence resulting from substituting
the value x for the free variables in the formulae represented by x . For an example see
(Boolos et al., 2002, p. 222).
Let μ(x) be the formula ∀y(D(x, y) → ¬T (y)). Let m = ∀y(D(x, y) → ¬T (y)).
We define λ to be the formula μ(m), or in other words ∀y(D(m, y) → ¬T (y)). Clearly
λ ↔ ¬T λ.
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When using defined sentences on a branch we add a rule that permits us to place the
definiendum at the end of the branch. Thus λ must be replaced by μ(m), which in turn
must be replaced by ∀y(D(x, m) → ¬T (y)), see Boolos et al. (2002).
EXAMPLE 2.7. sK λ.
Note that at the first fork all of the other branches close because D(m, y) is only true
when λ is substituted for y. Similarly, when using the formula ∀y... the only sub-
stitution worth making is λ. This is because for any other n we will get a trivially
open branch containing ¬D(m, n). Thus, we see that the tableau will not close since
we have just ended up back where we started and everything before this point has been
discharged.
Observe that the right hand branch does not close despite having both λ and ¬λ on
it. The reason for this is that neither λ nor ¬λ are in L the fragment of the language
not involving the truth predicate. Thus the conditions for closure of the branch are not
satisfied.
Moreover, we also note that our diagonal predicate did exactly what it ought to have.
We saw that λ is equivalent to ¬T λ and that is where the branch leads us. So rather
than write out the above in full, we shall be content with the following, much simpler,
tableau:
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in which we feel free to substitute the equivalent sentences resulting from the application
of the diagonal lemma.
2.4. Equivalence. We now show that each of the definitions of the minimal strong
Kleene fixed point are equivalent. We assume that we have a uniform procedure for con-
structing tableau. This is just a way of ordering the moves so that we can associate with
each sentence a particular tableau. For each ϕ we shall call this the standard tableau for ϕ.
DEFINITION 2.8. Let the tableau-rank of a tableau, T , be the least ordinal such that there
is an order preserving map from T into the ordinals where T is considered to be a tree
formed from finite sequences of formula. Let the tableau-rank of ϕ, abbreviated ρT ab(ϕ),
be the tableau-rank of the standard tableau for ϕ, if it is closed and ∞ otherwise. For
ϕ ∈ 	+sK ∪ 	−sK (ϕ ∈ sK ), let the 	-rank (-rank) of a sentence ϕ, abbreviated ρ	(ϕ)
(ρ(ϕ)) be the least α such that that ϕ ∈ 	+α ∪ 	−α (ϕ ∈ α) and ∞ if there is no such
ordinal.
THEOREM 2.9. The following are equivalent:
(1) sK χ;
(2) χ ∈ 	+sK ; and
(3) χ ∈ sK .
Proof. (2.↔3.) is a folk result (see Halbach, 2011).
(3.→1.) By induction on the -rank. Suppose χ is a true arithmetic literal. Then sK χ ,
follows by definition. Suppose that for all β ≤ α we have ϕ ∈ β ⇒sK ϕ and that
χ ∈ α+1. It suffices to show that sK χ . Suppose χ is of the form ϕ ∧ ψ . Then both
ϕ ∈ α and ψ ∈ α . By induction hypothesis, sK ϕ and sK ψ . Let us take closed
tableau Tϕ and Tψ respectively. Then the following tree closes:
and thus sK χ . The other cases are similar. The limit case is trivial. (1.→3.) By induction
on the tableau-rank. 
§3. van Fraassen supervaluation. In the introduction, we observed that for the strong
Kleene definition, logical truths like ¬(T λ ∧ ¬T λ) failed to get into the extension of
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the truth predicate. In this section, we explore one method of recapturing this. To motivate
the approach we attempt some diagnosis of this problem. With the previous definition we
restricted our closure conditions in such a way that only arithmetic sentences could cause a
branch to close. Thus, there is a sense in which our truth definition is generated upon a basis
of arithmetic truths. The arithmetic basis can be observed more clearly in the finer-grained
definition of sK . Now if arithmetic is the only intended ground of our definition, then
it seems as if the strong Kleene definition is the appropriate one to take up. However, we
may also want to capture the logical truths. Informally speaking, our goal in this section
is to provide a truth definition which takes as its basis both logical and arithmetic truths.
We shall do this in two stages. First we shall make an alternative definition of the van
Fraassen supervaluation truth extension. The goal of this is to make our informal motiva-
tion more transparent. Second, we provide an infinitary tableau for these definitions and
show that all three are equivalent.
We first provide a high-level description of the process we shall use. Given that we want
to capture logical truths, an obvious way of doing this is to use a conception of proof.
We shall thus define an infinitary proof system to ensure that we capture logical truths as
well as arithmetic ones. The proof notion defined will form the engine for induction steps
in the truth definition. It will not be the main tableau system, which gives the intended
extension of the truth predicate; rather it will be a bridging system which allows us to
keep improving our guesses about truth. Intuitively speaking, the natural place to start is
with the atomic arithmetic sentences. They form our pool of axioms and we start off by
proving everything that we can from them. Now since we have proven these sentences, we
can, indeed ought to, throw these into the extension of the truth predicate. Thus, we shall
augment our axiom pool with these new sentences. We then prove everything we can from
the new axiom set. We then repeat the process into the transfinite reaching a fixed point,
which we shall call vF .
3.1. Bridging tableau (vF ). We now define the conception of proof that will be used
for the induction step. We shall regard it as a bridging system between 	vF and vF .
Intuitively, the tableau is designed to show that given  ⊆ LT , χ ∈ LT is the case in
the standard model of arithmetic expanded with a one place relation T constrained in such
a way that the interpretation of T is both a superset of  and does not intersect ¬˙.
Or informally, given the truth-guess , we ought to add χ to the extension of the truth
predicate. We shall write this as  vF χ .
3.1.1. Starting conditions. To attempt to show that  vF χ , we commence the
tableau by placing ¬χ at the root.
3.1.2. Rules. We take the rules (∧), (¬∧), (¬¬), (∀) and (¬∀). These are just the
connective rules and quantifier rules from Section 2.2.2.
In place of the truth rules, we add the following axiom rules. Given a set of axioms 
we may apply either of the rules below at any point in the construction of a branch.
(AxT )
T ϕ
(Ax¬T )
¬T ϕ
where ϕ ∈  where (¬ϕ) ∈ 
Informally speaking, the new truth rules allow us to pull sentences from our stock of
axioms. We are allowing ourselves to add T ϕ if ϕ is an axiom; thus, cutting off any
branches that attempt to run with its negation.
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3.1.3. Closing conditions. A branch B closes if either:
• some formula ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ occurs on B; or
• a false arithmetic sentence occurs on B.
With the proof system defined, we may now define our jump function.
DEFINITION 3.1. Let hvF : P(Sent) → P(Sent) be such that
ϕ ∈ hvF () ⇔  vF ϕ.
The jump function takes a set of sentences as axioms and puts everything that can be proven
from those axioms , into the extension of the truth predicate.
DEFINITION 3.2. The intended extension vF is defined by transfinite recursion as fol-
lows:
0 := ∅
α+1 := hvF (α)
β :=
⋃
α∈β
αfor limit β.
Let vF be α for the least α such that α = α+1.
Clearly hvF is monotonic, so we are justified in our assumption that vF has a fixed point.
3.2. Main tableau (vF ). We now define an infinitary tableau for vF , which we shall
abbreviate as vF . This tableau will give us the intended extension of the truth predicate.
3.2.1. Starting the tableau. The tableau for χ ∈ LT is commenced by placing ¬χ at
the root of the tree.
3.2.2. Rules. We take the rules (∧), (¬∧), (¬¬), (∀) and (¬∀) from Section 2.2.2.
In place of the truth rules we add the following subtableau rule:
(Sub) If at any point in the construction of a branchB, a formula of the form T ψ or
¬T ψ occurs on B, then a subtableau may be constructed which commences
with ψ or ¬ψ respectively. This subtableau is governed by the same rules as
the main tableau.
3.2.3. Closing conditions. A branch B is deemed to close if either:
• for some sentence ϕ ∈ LT (i.e. including truth), both ϕ and ¬ϕ occur on B;
• a false arithmetic sentence occurs on B; or
• a subtableau for one of the sentences on B is closed, where a subtableau is closed
if all of its branches are closed.
If all the branches of a tableau for χ close, then that tableau is closed. We abbreviate this
as vF χ . Observe that a proof in this system may involve a nested tree of subtableau.
3.3. Examples.
EXAMPLE 3.3. vF λ ∨ ¬λ.
¬(λ ∨ ¬λ)
¬λ
¬¬λ
×
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We shall indicate a subtableau by placing a ⇒ between the original tableau and its
subtableau. This works well enough for one or two tableau but will quickly become too
complex with more subtableau. In these cases, a more elaborate book-keeping system
may be adopted which connects the subtableau to their origin point on an earlier tableau.
We shall not need this here.
EXAMPLE 3.4. vF λ.
¬λ
¬¬T λ
T λ
⇒ λ
¬T λ
⇒ ¬λ
...
EXAMPLE 3.5.  ¬(T λ ∧ T ¬λ).
3.4. Equivalence. We now prove that each of the definitions of the minimal van
Fraassen fixed point are equivalent. First we state and prove the crucial lemma, which will
allow us to link the original definition 	vF from the introduction to vF . The following
definition is useful.
DEFINITION 3.6. The positive complexity of a sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT , abbreviated κ(ϕ) is
defined by recursion as follows:
• κ(ψ ∧ χ) = max(κ(ψ), κ(χ)) + 1
• κ(¬(ψ ∧ χ)) = max(κ(ψ), κ(χ)) + 1
• κ(¬¬ψ) = κ(ψ) + 1
• κ(∀xψ) = κ(ψ(n)) + 1 for some/any n ∈ ω
• κ(¬∀xψ) = κ(¬ψ(n)) + 1 for some/any n ∈ ω
LEMMA 3.7. ∀ vF , V al(χ) = 1 iff  vF χ .
Proof. (→) Suppose  vF χ . Then in any bridging tableau for χ and  there will be an
open branch B. It will suffice to show that there is some  vF  such that V al(χ) = 0.
To construct the model, we take the domain ω and let the terms denote their correspond-
ing numbers. The arithmetic part of the signature is interpreted in the usual way. We then
let  be the set of ϕ such that either: T ϕ occurs on B; or ϕ is of the form (¬ψ) and
¬T ψ occurs on B. Since B is open, every instance of (AxT ) and (Ax¬T ) must be used,
so we have T ζ and ¬T δ on B for all ζ, (¬δ) ∈ . Thus  vF .
The following claim suffices.
CLAIM. If σ is on B, then V al(σ) = 1.
Proof. By induction on the positive complexity of sentences. For illustration, we do
some of the cases.
If σ is an arithmetic literal, then σ cannot be false in the standard model, thus
V al(σ) = 1.
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If σ is of the form ϕ ∧ ψ , then both ϕ and ψ are on B via the tableau rule (∧). Then by
induction hypothesis, V al(ϕ) = 1 and V al(ψ) = 1; and thus, V al(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1.
If σ if of the form ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), then either (¬ϕ) or (¬ψ) is on B. Assume the first case.
Then by induction hypothesis, V al(¬ϕ) = 1 and V al(¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) = 1; similarly if
(¬ψ) is on B. The quantifier cases are similar.
If σ is of the form T ψ, then by definition, ψ ∈  and thus V al(T ψ) = 1. If σ is
of the form ¬T ψ, the tableau rules ensure that T ψ does not occur on B . Thus ψ /∈ 
and V al(¬T ψ) = 1. 
(←) Suppose there is some  vF  such that V al(χ) = 0. It will suffice to show
that there is a completed open branch in the tableau for χ . We shall do this in two stages.
First we shall construct a tableau T that makes no use of the (AxT ) and (Ax¬T ) rules.
Then we shall show how to find a particular open branch B in T which could not be closed
using applications of (AxT ) or (Ax¬T ).
We use  as guide for the construction of an open branch B such that for every ϕ
on B, V al(ϕ) = 1. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of branches in the
tableau. We look at one case for illustration. Suppose we come to a sentence of the form
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ). Then by induction hypothesis, we have V al(¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) = 1. The tableau
rules dictate that there will be branches which fork into a ¬ϕ and a ¬ψ path. By the V al
definition, V al(¬ϕ) = 1 or V al(¬ψ) = 1; and thus, the branch can be continued by
selecting one in which the formula is evaluated to 1. Clearly, this will give us an open
branch B.
Now suppose for reductio, that some application of the (AxT ) or (Ax¬T ) could close
B. We first observe that for all sentences ϕ on B, we have V al(ϕ) = 1 by construction.
Thus for all sentences of the form T ϕ or ¬T ψ that occur on B, we have ϕ, (¬ψ) ∈
. But then since  vF , it is not possible to find a sentence in  which could
close B. 
PROPOSITION 3.8. If B ⊆ 	 and B vF χ , then 	 vF χ .
In order to prove the equivalence between the three van Fraassen supervaluation defini-
tions, we shall need to place a rank on a tree of tableau which form a proof of some ϕ. We
do this by considering an alternative method of notating the tableau. The change is merely
for bookkeeping purposes and is not particularly visible in the actual proof.
Instead of starting a subtableau on some branch B, we shall continue along the same
branch but tag the sentences that would have occurred on the subtableau with a flag (some
n ∈ ω) which distinguishes them from other sentences on that branch. To deal with embed-
ded subtableau we shall flag sentences with a sequence of natural numbers, 〈n1, . . . , nm〉.
Thus, we do not just place sentences ϕ on a branch but rather pairs of the form
ϕ, 〈n1, . . . , nm〉. The truth rules thus become:
T ψ, 〈n1, . . . , nm〉
ψ, 〈n1, . . . , nm, k〉
¬T ψ, 〈n1, . . . , nm〉
¬ψ, 〈n1, . . . , nm, k〉
where k is is the first k ∈ ω such that ϕ, 〈n1, . . . , nm, k〉 does not occur on the branch
for any ϕ. We shall call the tuple 〈n1, . . . , nm, k〉 a flag. The rules for closure need to be
slightly amended such that a branch B closes when a sentence ϕ and ¬ϕ occur on B and
both ϕ and ¬ϕ have the same flag. Thus if we have ϕ, n and ¬ϕ, n on branch B, then B is
closed. It is clear that the proof systems are equivalent. We shall call a tableau constructed
in this way a flagged tableau.
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DEFINITION 3.9. We let the vF-rank of ϕ, abbreviated ρvF (ϕ) be the least ordinal α such
that there is an order preserving map from the flagged tableau commencing with ϕ into α,
if vF ϕ; and ∞ otherwise.
Using this notation, we may also extract from some tableau T a subtableau indexed by
〈n1, . . . , nm〉 by removing all the sentence-indexes tagged by sequences which do not
commence with 〈n1, . . . , nm〉.
We now prove the main theorem. The basic strategy is to use the bridging tableau system
as a means of setting up the induction step for the main tableau. Essentially, we are going
to use the sentences from the axiom pool of a bridging tableau to house the sentences we
could have already proved using a subtableau. Thus, the bridging tableau will form the
lever for the induction argument.
THEOREM 3.10. The following are equivalent:
(1) ϕ ∈ 	vF ;
(2) ϕ ∈ vF ;
(3) vF ϕ.
Proof. (3.→1.) By induction on the vF -rank of the tableau. Suppose for all β < α we
have
ρvF (¬ψ) = β ⇒ ψ ∈ 	vF and ρvF (ψ) = β ⇒ (¬ψ) ∈ 	vF
Now suppose ρvF (¬ϕ) = α; i.e., vF ϕ and the closed tableau verifying this has
vF-rank α. Let
B+ = {¬ψ | T ψ occurs in the tableau for ¬ϕ and a closed subtableau results from ψ}
B− = {ψ | ¬T ψ occurs in the tableau for ¬ϕ and a closed subtableau results from ¬ψ}
Then clearly, B+ ∪ B− vF ϕ. Suppose (¬ψ) ∈ B+. Then since this means there
is a closed subtableau commencing with ψ , there is a β < α such that ρvF (ψ) = β.
Thus, by induction we have (¬ψ) ∈ 	vF . Similarly, if ψ ∈ B−, we have ψ ∈ 	vF . Thus
B+ ∪ B− ⊆ 	vF and by Proposition 3.8, we have 	vF vF ϕ; and by Lemma 3.7, we
have ϕ ∈ 	vF since 	vF is a fixed point.
Now suppose ρvF (ϕ) = α; i.e., vF ¬ϕ and the closed tableau verifying this has
vF-rank α + 1. The proof is similar to the previous case in that we show B+ ∩ B− ⊆
	vF , except B+ and B− are defined relative to a main tableau commencing with ¬¬ϕ
rather than ϕ. We note that for (¬ψ) ∈ B+, the closed subtableau commencing with
ψ must be such that ρvF (ψ) = β < α since the main tableau with vF-rank α + 1
commenced with ¬¬ϕ and so the first rule applied must have been (¬¬). Similarly
for ψ ∈ B−.
(1.→3.) By induction on the 	-rank of sentences. Suppose that for all β ≤ α we have
ψ ∈ 	β ⇒vF ψ and that ϕ ∈ 	α+1. It suffices to show that vF ϕ. By hypothesis, we
know that for all  vF 	α , V al(ϕ) = 1. Thus by Lemma 3.7, 	α  ϕ. Let us call this
tableau T.
Now suppose we start the vF-tableau for ϕ and construct it the same way as T except
that applications of (AxT ) and (Ax¬T ) from T are not performed. Call this tableau TvF .
Now suppose for that some branch BvF is open in TvF . We claim that wherever this occurs
it could have been closed via a subtableau. Thus vF ϕ.
The only way that BvF could have become closed while its counterpart B in T
remained open is if for some ψ both T ψ and ¬T ψ occur on some branch B but
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only one of them occurs on BvF . But by definition of T, we see that either ψ ∈ 	α or
(¬ψ) ∈ 	α; i.e., exactly one of them must have resulted from either the (AxT ) or (Ax¬T )
rules. Assuming the former case, we then have vF ψ by the induction hypothesis and
thus a subtableau commencing would ψ close. The latter case is similar.
(2.↔1.) This follows straightforwardly from Lemma 3.7. 
§4. Cantini supervaluation. We now discuss a second form of supervaluation as
developed by Cantini in Cantini (1990). The usual way of defining it was discussed in
the introduction, but like van Fraassen supervaluation, it can also be defined using a proof
theoretic device. In this section, we shall construct a bridging tableau system like the one
from the beginning of the previous section. Then we construct a tableau for the minimal
fixed point and finally, we show that all three definitions are equivalent.
4.1. Bridging tableau (Ca).
4.1.1. Starting the tableau. To attempt to show that  Ca χ , we commence tableau
by placing ¬χ at the root of the tree.
4.1.2. Rules. We take the rules (∧), (¬∧), (¬¬), (∀), (¬∀), (AxT ) and (Ax¬T ).5
4.1.3. Closing conditions. A branch B is deemed to close if either:
• some sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT (i.e. including truth), both ϕ and ¬ϕ occur on B;• some sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT , both T ϕ and T ¬ϕ; or• a false arithmetic sentence occurs on B.
The key difference from the van Fraassen system is the second condition, which
demands that we close a branch if it exhibits a truth extension that is, in some sense,
inconsistent.
If all the branches of the tableau are closed, then that tableau is closed. We abbreviate
this as  Ca χ .
4.2. Main tableau (Ca).
4.2.1. Starting condition. We commence a tableau for χ and  by placing the sentence
¬χ at the root of the tree.
4.2.2. Rules. We take the rules (∧), (¬∧), (¬¬), (∀), (¬∀) and (Sub).
4.2.3. Closing conditions. A branch B in a tableau T for some χ is closed if either:
• for some sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT and its negation ¬ϕ occurs on B;• for some sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT both T ϕ and T ¬ϕ occur on B;• a false arithmetic sentence occurs on B; or
• a truth-subtableau for B closes.
If all the branches of the tableau close, then the tableau is closed and we write
 Ca χ .6
5 Recall the rules (AxT ) and (Ax¬T ) allow us to exploit the set of sentences .
6 For readers familiar with Cantini’s Cantini (1990), similarities may be discerned between
Cantini’s infinitary Tait calculus, Definition 4.1, and the tableau system discussed above.
Cantini’s AX.3 does much the same work as the second of our closure conditions above.
Moreover, Cantini’s (T ) and (¬T ) rules play a similar role to the subtableau used in the
system above. The fact that we are using a subtableau roughly corresponds to Cantini’s demand
that proofs of sentences of the form Tϕ and ¬Tϕ must be established without recourse
to auxiliary assumptions.
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4.3. Examples.
EXAMPLE 4.1. Ca ¬(T λ ∧ T ¬λ).
¬¬(T λ ∧ T ¬λ)
(T λ ∧ T ¬λ)
T λ
T ¬λ
×
EXAMPLE 4.2. Ca ¬(T T λ ∧ T ¬λ).
4.4. Equivalence. We now establish that the proof theory is sound and complete with
regard to fixed point definition provided in Section §1. First we establish that our bridging
tableau links with the jump function used in the introduction.
LEMMA 4.3. For all  Ca , V al(ϕ) = 1 iff  Ca ϕ.
Proof. (→) Similar to 3.7. Suppose  Ca ϕ and use an open branch B to show that
there is some  Ca  such that V al(ϕ) = 0. The only difference is that  must also
be consistent. Suppose it was not. Then for some ψ both T ψ and T ¬ψ must occur
on B contradicting the fact that it is open. (←) Similar to Lemma 3.7. 
THEOREM 4.4. ϕ ∈ 	Ca iff Ca ϕ.
Proof. (←) By induction on Ca-rank. Suppose that for all β < α we have βCa ψ ⇒
ψ ∈ 	Ca and that αCa ϕ. It suffice to show that ϕ ∈ 	Ca . Similar to Theorem 3.10, except
here we exploit Lemma 4.3.
(→) Similar to Theorem 3.10. 
4.5. Other truth definitions.
4.5.1. Strengthening consistency. The notion of consistency used for Cantini super-
valuation is exceedingly weak. To see this, consider the sentence ϕ := λ ∧ λ. This is
obviously logically equivalent to λ. However, while ¬T λ ∨ ¬T λ ∈ 	Ca , it is not the
case that ¬T ϕ∨¬T ¬λ is in 	Ca . This is because the notion of a Ca-expansion does
not recognise logical equivalence. It simply rules out those expansions which contain some
sentence ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ: it only respects the syntactic form. Thus, it seems like it
would be more interesting to consider expansions which are genuinely logically consistent.
DEFINITION 4.5.  is a Con-expansion of , abbreviated  Con , if
•  ⊇ ; and
•  is logically consistent.
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The rest of the definition is then carried out in the usual way and we denote the resultant
truth extension 	Con .
To provide a tableau system for this, we replace the new rule added to the Cantini truth
definition with the following. At any point in the construction of a branch B, a subtableau
may be formed by taking a collection B of sentences of the form T ϕ and completing
an ordinary first order logic tableau commencing with B. Such a tableau system can be
found in Smullyan (1968) or Priest (2008). If this tableau closes, then B is deemed to have
closed.
Finally, we might also consider expansions that are not only consistent but complete.7
DEFINITION 4.6.  is an Ep-expansion of , abbreviated  Ep  if
•  ⊇ ; and
• for all ψ , ψ ∈  iff (¬ψ) /∈ .
We modify the tableau system by allowing us to pull sets of negated truth sentences from
the tree and start subtableau using them.
§5. 11 sets and complexity. In this section we use the tableau system to give simple
and transparent proofs:
• that the definitions provided above are 11-complete; and
• that the height of Kripke’s fixed point is ωC K1 (the supremum of the recursive
ordinals).
The first result is not new, having first been claimed by Kripke and presented by Burgess
in Burgess (1986). However, the manner in which the result is established is informative
because it clearly illustrates that there is a sense in which our tableau definition just is
one of the canonical representations of a 11-complete set. Moreover the result established
below can be easily generalised to apply to each of the other tableau systems proposed
in this paper.8 The second result is a well-known folk theorem from Spector, however,
the usual proofs in the literature require a significant detour through generalised recursion
theory, admissible set theory or proof theory: see Sacks (1990, p. 78), Barwise (1975,
pp. 173 and 210), and Pohlers (2009, p. 94).9 We provide a direct proof for the strong
Kleene fixed point which, while somewhat technical, is self-contained. While the proof of
complexity is relatively straightforward, it is anticipated that the reader may want to do
some ancillary scribbling for the calculation of the fixed point.
7 We think of this as an epistemicist approach to truth on the following basis. We start by taking
it that there is some fixed extension of the truth predicate which is both consistent and complete.
We take it that while the real extension is, so to speak, out there, there is no way for us to come
to know it. So the holder of such a theory is an epistemicist in the sense that they believe that
the truth predicate, metaphysically speaking, has a fixed extension; but we are not in an epistemic
position to grasp it. However, even with only these constraints we can still say a great deal about
what is true. By supervaluating over all of the extensions which are complete and consistent we
are assured of obtaining sentences which are in the real extension.
8 The easiest way to make this generalisation is by avoiding the subtableau and adopting the flagged
tableau discussed above Definition 3.9.
9 The techniques of the next section can be used to obtain more general results overlapping these
areas of mathematical logic. If the reader is interested in further developing these skills, Barwise’s
framework of admissible set theory is probably the most versatile. However, a background in the
constructible hierarchy (Devlin, 1984) and descriptive set theory (Moschovakis, 1980) is also
helpful.
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The following two theorems may help motivate the importance of 11-sets from the point
of view of descriptive set theory and generalised recursion theory.
THEOREM 5.1 (Gödel). For all recursively enumerable subsets A ⊆ ω, there is a 1
formula ϕ of set theory such that
n ∈ A ⇔ Lω | ϕ[n].
This is just a restatement of the result that recursively enumerable functions can be repre-
sented in the language of arithmetic by formulae that use a single unbounded existential
quantifier (see, for example, Boolos et al., 2002, p. 206).
THEOREM 5.2 (Spector-Gandy). For all 11 subsets A ⊆ ω there is a 1 formula ϕ of set
theory such that
n ∈ A ⇔ LωC K1 | ϕ[n]
where ωC K1 is the supremum of the recursive well-orderings.
Thus there is a sense a 11 set plays much the same role as a recursively enumerable set:
it is a generalisation of that concept. LωC K1 is the smallest chunk of set theory in which we
can execute our infinitary proofs. Similarly Lω is the smallest chunk of set theory in which
our ordinary finitary proofs can be executed.
We shall use α, β for functions from ω to ω. Let ω<ω denote the set of finite sequences
of natural numbers.10 Let 〈·〉 : ω<ω ∼= ω be a recursive bijection coding finite sequences
of natural numbers using the naturals. We write 〈1, 2, 3〉 = 5 if 5 is the code number of the
sequence consisting of 1, 2 and 3. Write n(i) for the i th element of the sequence coded by
n. Let ·¯ : ω ∼= ω<ω be the inverse of 〈·〉. Let lh : ω → ω be a function taking the code
of a sequence to its length; i.e., for n ∈ ω, lh(n) is the length of n¯. Let ·· : ω × ω ∼= ω
be a function which takes the codes of two sequences and returns the code of the first
concatenated with the second.11 For α ∈ ωω, we shall write α|n to mean the restriction of
α ∈ ωω to its first n values; and for n ∈ ω we shall write n¯|m to denote the restriction of
the finite sequence n¯ ∈ ω<ω to its first m values assuming it has that many.
A tree S on ωk is a set of k-tuples of finite sequences of natural numbers (i.e. S ⊆
(ω<ω)k) such that:
• for all (n¯1, . . . , n¯k) ∈ S, lh(ni ) = lh(n1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k; and
• if (n¯1, . . . , n¯k) ∈ S and i < lh(n1), then (n¯1|i , . . . , n¯k |i ) ∈ S.
We shall say that the function α represents the tree S ⊆ (ω<ω)k if
∀n1, . . . , nk((n¯1, . . . , n¯k) ∈ S ↔ α(〈n1, . . . , nk〉) = 0).
A tree S is recursively enumerable if it is represented by a partial recursive function. We
shall now consider a particular type of tree on ω2. Suppose S ⊆ (ω<ω)2 is a tree such that
for all (n¯, m¯) ∈ S we have n(i) = n(1) for all i ≤ lh(n). So we always have a constant
10 Note that in this paper we also use α, β to represent ordinals, but we shall take care to ensure that
this causes no confusion.
11 We note that the usual practice when defining length and concatenation functions for sequences
would be to define them on the sequences themselves rather than their codes (Moschovakis, 1980).
However, given our need to articulate these facts in the language of arithmetic, this has the effect
of making the syntax unpleasantly cumbersome.
INFINITARY TABLEAU FOR SEMANTIC TRUTH 225
function in the first component. This means we lose no information if we take S and form
the set
S′ = {(k, m¯) | ∃i ≤ lh(m)(k = n(i) ∧ (n¯, m¯) ∈ S} ∪ {(k, 〈¯〉)}.
We call such a set a p-tree. Given a recursive p-tree S we let Sn = {m¯ | (n, m¯) ∈ S}.
DEFINITION 5.3 (See Mansfield & Weitkamp, 1985, p. 35). A ⊆ ω is 11 if there is a
recursively enumerable p-tree S such that n ∈ A iff
∀α∃m (n, α|m) /∈ S.
REMARK 5.4. In other words n ∈ A iff the tree Sn on ω is well founded. Thus to check
whether n ∈ A, we need to show that there are no infinite paths through the tree Sn. We
observe that the set of indices for well-founded recursive trees is a canonical example of
a 11-complete set. It is also worth noting that we could have demanded that the p-tree S
was recursive (and not merely recursively enumerable), but the condition above is more
convenient for our purposes.
DEFINITION 5.5. A ⊆ ω is 11-complete if A is 11 and A is 11-hard where that means
that for any 11, B ⊆ ω, there is a recursive function f such that
n ∈ B ↔ f (n) ∈ A.
There is a sense in which a 11-complete set is a universal machine for all of the 
1
1
sets. For any 11 set there is a simple means of figuring out its contents using a 
1
1-
complete set. The proof of the theorem below illustrates this. This result can be generalised
to apply to any tableau system possessing a sufficiently similar truth rule, which is most
of them.
5.1. 	sK is a 11-complete set.
THEOREM 5.6. {ϕ | sK ϕ} = A is 11-complete.
REMARK 5.7. Showing that A is 11 is quite straightforward. In order to verify 11-
hardness, our strategy will be to use our infinitary tableau to track infinite potential paths
through the trees which represent 11 sets. We shall use the diagonal lemma to construct a
sentence such that the tableau theory forces us to play out all of the possible paths through
the tree. Thus if the tableau closes, then none of the paths could have been infinite and the
tree is well founded. The resultant tableau is, in some sense, the same as the recursive tree;
and once this is seen, the result is obvious. The work of the proof is just the task of making
the correspondence explicit.
Proof. (of Theorem 5.6) It should be clear that a tableau for ϕ can be construed as
a recursively enumerable tree Sϕ.12 Moreover, with a slight tweak, ϕ′s being in A is
reducible to the well-foundedness of S¬ϕ.13 Thus, A is 11.
12 See the proof of Lemma 48 for more detail.
13 The tweak required is to ensure that an infinite branch ensues when a branch is not closed. For
example, the branch consisting of just 0 = 0 is open but not infinite. To remedy this, we just
conjoin the sentence ∀x x = x to the sentence at the top of the tableau. This new sentence has no
effect on the outcome of the tableau but will ensure that an open branch is infinite.
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We now verify that A is 11-hard. Take an arbitrary 
1
1 set, B. By Definition 5.3, there
is some recursively enumerable p-tree S such that
n ∈ B ↔ Sn is well founded.
By the diagonal lemma,14 let ψ(n, m) be such that
ψ(n, m) ↔ ((n, m¯) ∈ S → ∀i T ψ(n, m〈i〉)).
Let f : ω → ω be the recursive function such that
n → ψ(n, 〈〉).
It suffices to show that
f (n) ∈ A ⇔ sK ψ(n, 〈〉) ⇔ Sn is well founded.
The first (⇔) follows by definition, so we concentrate on the second.
(⇒) Suppose Sn is not well founded. Then there is some α such that for all
m, (n, α|m)∈ S. Fix such an α. It will suffice to show that there is an open branch B in the
tableau commencing with ¬ψ(n, 〈〉). We construct B by recursion and show by induction
that:
• for all m ∈ ω, Bm is not closed; and
• that B = ⋃m Bm is fully discharged.
This then gives us an open branch which suffices for the proof.
Let B0 be the branch (indicated in bold) of the tableau commencing as follows:
The tree branches infinitely here, so we must eventually come to the first initial segment
of α: α|1. Now suppose we are given Bm . Bm+1 is then obtained by extending the branch
along the bold part of the following tableau.
14 We are being a little loose with the notation here. First, we shall be somewhat relaxed about the
use of numerals. Thus, we shall mostly just write n instead of the more correct n. Second, we note
that it is essential that n, m and i are free in the diagonal sentence above. We also ought to define a
recursive function ψ(·, ·〈·〉) : ω3 → ω which takes m, n and i and returns the code number of
the formula ψ(m, n〈i〉) where the numerals for m, n and i have been simultaneously substituted
into the three distinct variable places in ψ(·, ·〈·〉) respectively. We may then represent such a
function using the language of arithmetic. The reader will see that this is a simple, albeit tedious,
task. Finally, (n, m¯) ∈ S is not part of the object language. However, since S is recursively
enumerable and m represents the sequence m¯, there is no harm in this shorthand.
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Again, at every level, we must eventually come to the appropriate initial segment of α:
α|m+1. In this manner, we use α as a guide for the construction of the infinite open branch.
By construction, we see that for all m every sentence on Bm is discharged on the branch
Bm+1. The only truth free sentences on B are of the form (n, α|m) ∈ S for some m, and
each of these are true by our assumption that α is an infinite path through S; thus B is not
closed. Thus B = ⋃m Bm is open.
(⇐) Suppose sK ψ(n, 〈〉). Then for any tableau commencing with ¬ψ(n, 〈〉) there will
be an open (and infinite) branch. It will suffice to find an α such that for all m, (n, α|m) ∈ S.
We use an open branch B of a tableau T to do this. We recursively define a particular
tableau T as follows:
Let T0 be the tableau commencing with ¬ψ(n, 〈〉) and proceeding as follows:
At stage m we have a tableau Tm such that the final point on each branch is a sentence
of the form ¬T ψ(n, j) where j¯ is a sequence of length m + 1. We extend each of these
branches in the following manner:
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Call the result Tm+1. Let T be the limit of the Tm’s. Now fix an (infinite) open branch
B from T . We use the sentences on B of the form (n, j) ∈ S to define the appropriate α.
Formally, we let α ∈ ωω be such that
α = {(i, k) | ∃m¯ ∈ ω<ω ‘(n, m¯) ∈ S’ occurs on B and ∃i < lh(m) m(i) = k}.
Clearly α ∈ ωω and α is a path through the tree Sn . Thus Sn is not well-founded. 
We now use the tableau from the proof above to make a definition that will be useful in the
next section.
DEFINITION 5.8. Let S ⊆ ω<ω be an arithmetic tree. Let S† = {(0, 〈n1, . . . , nk〉) ∈
ω × ω<ω | 〈n1, . . . , nk〉 ∈ S}. Using the diagonal lemma in the same way as we did in the
proof above, let ψS(n, m) be such that
ψS(n, m) ↔ ((n, m¯) ∈ S† → ∀i T ψS(n, m¯〈i〉))).
Let the canonical tableau for S be the tableau commencing with ¬ψS(0, 〈〉) and constructed
exactly as in the second half of the proof of Theorem 5.6.
Note that the “0” plays no real role. It is just a place filler that allows us to re-use much the
same tableau as in Theorem 5.6. Also note that below, we shall mostly be concerned with
trees S ⊆ ω<ω that are recursive.
PROPOSITION 5.9. S is well-founded iff sK ψS(0, 〈〉) (i.e., the canonical tableau for
S is closed).
5.2. Fixed point height. We now prove that the fixed point height for the strong Kleene
truth definition is ωC K1 . Our strategy is to confirm that the ranks of the tableau proofs have
a supremum of ωC K1 and use that fact to show that the closure ordinal for Kripke’s original
definition is also ωC K1 (i.e., Definition 1.3). There is a sense in which we almost have the
result in our grasp from the beginning. We note the following fact can be easily found or
established (Hjorth, unpublished; Sacks, 1990; Mansfield & Weitkamp, 1985).
FACT 5.10. The supremum of the tree-ranks of trees on ω<ω of complexity between 01
(recursive) and 11 is ωC K1 : the supremum of the recursive ordinals.
It should be pretty clear (although we’ll discuss it further) that each of our tableaux is
essentially a recursive tree. Thus, the tableau-ranks of our tableau will be bounded by
ωC K1 . Moreover, using our canonical tableau from the proof of Theorem 5.6, it is easy to
see that for every recursive tree there will be a tableau with much the same rank - in fact, a
little greater. Thus, the recursive ordinals are exhausted and we get a lower bound of ωC K1
too.
This sketch does not, however, give us our target result. We want to calculate the closure
ordinal of Kripke’s original definition from Kripke (1975). Nonetheless, this sketch does
tell us that ωC K1 is the natural conjecture and should guide our intuitions through the proof.
In making all this precise, we shall establish a number of other comparative results. To
get a clearer idea of the strategy, the reader may prefer to work backwards from the main
result, Corollary 5.23.
In this section, we shall make use of a restricted form of our tableau in which we remove
the closure condition which states that a branch containing a sentence ϕ ∈ L and its
negation is closed. This has no effect on the completeness of the system. We shall also
assume that we have a uniform recursive procedure for constructing tableau. This is just a
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way of ordering the moves so that we can associate with each sentence a particular tableau.
For each ϕ we shall call this the standard tableau for ϕ.
Given that the stages of Kripke’s inductive definition measure, loosely speaking, the
number of truth predicates that are prefixed to a sentence, it will be useful to make a similar
measure of truth-rank for the tableau system.
DEFINITION 5.11. Let T be a strong Kleene tableau and let ϕ, ψ be finite sequences of
sentences which are (not necessarily proper) initial segments of branches in T . Let
ϕ ≺TT ψ ↔ ϕ is a proper initial segment of ψ and
a truth rule (i.e., (T ) or (¬T )) is applied in the part of ψ extending ϕ
We first define the truth-rank of some finite branch ϕ in tableau T by recursion with a
function ρTT : (SentLT )<ω → On such that:
ρTT ( ϕ) = sup{ρTT ( ψ) + 1 | ϕ ≺TT ψ}.
The truth-rank of a tableau T is ρTT (〈ϕ〉) where ϕ is at the top of the tableau. We let the
truth-rank of a sentence ϕ, ρT (ϕ), be the truth-rank of the standard tableau commencing
with ϕ if such exists; otherwise ∞.
REMARK 5.12. Observe that the truth-rank of a tableau is a coarser grained measure
than its tableau-rank; i.e., the tableau-rank of a tableau will be greater than or equal to its
truth-rank.
PROPOSITION 5.13. For all ϕ ∈ SentLT , ρT (ϕ) ≤ ρT ab(ϕ).15
We now show that the truth-ranks of tableau exhaust the recursive ordinals and are bounded
by their supremum. We let the tree-rank of a tree S ⊆ ω<ω be defined as follows. Let
ρST ree : ω
<ω → On be defined by recursion for s ∈ S such that
ρST ree(s) = sup
{
ρST ree(t) + 1 | t extends s in S
}
.
We let ρT ree(S) = ρST ree(〈〉).
REMARK 5.14. Note that we now have five different ranking functions in play:
(1) ρ	 (Kripke’s original - see Definition 2.8);
(2) ρ (for the finer grained jump - see Definition 2.8);
(3) ρT ab (for tableau - see Definition 2.8);
(4) ρT (for calculating truth usage in a tableau - see Definition 5.11); and
(5) ρT ree (for trees on ω<ω - see remarks immediately above).
15 For a couple of examples, we note that: ρT (T0 = 0) = 1 while ρT ab(T0 = 0) = 2; and
ρT (∀nT app(n)) = ρT ab(∀nT app(n)) = ω. The discrepancy in the finite cases is caused by
a slightly eccentric difference between our definition of ρT ab and ρT . An equivalent definition
of ρT ab can be provided which has much the same form as the definition of ρT above. When
defining ≺TT ab we ask for mere proper extensions, rather than also demanding that a truth-rule
has been applied. We then define ρTT ab in the same way. However, when we come to define the
tableau-rank of the tableau, we take the rank of a point immediately above the root of the tableau:
ρTT ab(〈〉). This is required for the equivalence, but not convenient below. We leave establishing
their equivalence as an exercise for the reader who may wish to consult (Mansfield & Weitkamp,
1985).
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LEMMA 5.15. For any well-founded recursive tree S ⊆ ω<ω of tree-rank α, there is a
sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT such that:
ρT (ϕ) = ρT ree(S).
Proof. Let S ⊆ ω<ωbe a well-founded recursive tree. Then it can be seen from the proof
of Theorem 5.6, that the canonical tableau T for S commencing with ¬ψS(0, 〈〉) is such
that
ρT (¬ψS(0, 〈〉)) = ρT ree(S).
We leave the proof for the reader noting that it is an induction on the tree-ranks of recursive
trees. 
LEMMA 5.16. For all ϕ ∈ SentLT the standard strong Kleene tableau Tϕ for ϕ is
isomorphic to a recursively enumerable tree S ⊆ ω<ω: i.e., there is a structure preserving
bijection between Tϕ and S as trees.
Proof. Tϕ may be represented by a set of sequences of sentences closed under initial
segments; i.e., Tϕ is a tree on (SentLT )<ω. By using our coding function · : SentLT ∼= ω,
we may transform Tϕ into a tree S ⊆ ω<ω. Moreover, if we consider a sequence s ∈ ω<ω
we see (by appeal to the Church-Turing thesis) that a Turing machine could be devised
which verified whether s ∈ S; thus, S is recursively enumerable. 
THEOREM 5.17. The supremum of the truth ranks of ϕ ∈ SentLT is ωC K1 .
Proof. (Lower bound) By Fact 5.10 and Lemma 5.15, we see that the recursive ordinals
are exhausted by the truth-ranks of sentences ϕ ∈ SentLT . (Upper bound) By Lemma 5.16,
we see for any sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT , we may find a recursively enumerable tree S which
is isomorphic as a tree to the tableau Tϕ for ϕ ; thus, ρT ree(S) = ρT ab(ϕ). Moreover, it
is clear by Proposition 5.13 that ρT ab(ϕ) ≥ ρT (ϕ). Thus, for every sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT
there is a recursively enumerable tree S such that ρT ree(S) ≥ ρT (ϕ). Fact 5.10 then tells
us that ωC K1 is an upper bound on the truth-rank of sentences. 
We shall exploit this fact about truth-ranks to fix the closure ordinal for Kripke’s induc-
tive definition. We now show that there is a sense in which the T -rank of a sentence is
always greater than its 	-rank. We shall exploit this to put an upper bound on the 	-ranks
of sentences.
LEMMA 5.18. For all ϕ ∈ 	+sK , ρ	(ϕ) ≤ ρT ab(¬ϕ) + 1.16
Proof. We show that for all ϕ ∈ 	+sK :
(1) ρT ab(¬ϕ) + 1 ≥ ρ(ϕ); and
(2) ρ(ϕ) ≥ ρ	(ϕ).
(1.) By induction on tableau rank. We suppose that for all β < α if ρT ab(¬ψ) = β, then
ρ(ψ) ≤ ρT ab(¬ψ) + 1. Suppose that ρT ab(¬ϕ) = α. We show that for all the ways of
forming such a closed tableau, ρ(ϕ) ≤ ρT ab(¬ϕ) + 1.
16 The +1 on the right hand side is caused by a discrepancy between the treatment of limit ordinals
in ranking tableau and running Kripke’s inductive definition: no sentence has 	-rank β for β a
limit ordinal.
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Suppose ϕ is a true arithmetic atomic sentence. Then ρT ab(¬ϕ) = 1 and ρ(ϕ) = 1.
Thus ρT ab(¬ϕ) + 1 ≥ ρ(ϕ).
Suppose ϕ := ¬¬ψ . Then ρT ab(¬ϕ) = ρT ab(¬¬¬ψ) = ρT ab(¬ψ) + 1, and by the
induction hypothesis we have ρ(ψ) ≤ ρT ab(¬ψ) + 1. Thus
ρT ab(¬¬¬ψ) + 1 = (ρT ab(¬ψ) + 1) + 1
≥ ρ(ψ) + 1
= ρ(¬¬ψ).
Suppose ϕ := ψ ∧ χ . By the induction hypothesis we have ρ(ψ) ≤ ρT ab(¬ψ) + 1
and ρ(χ) ≤ ρT ab(¬χ) + 1. Then we see that,
ρT ab(¬(ψ ∧ χ)) + 1 = sup{ρT ab(¬ψ) + 1, ρT ab(¬χ) + 1} + 1
≥ sup{ρ(ψ), ρ(χ)} + 1
= ρ(ψ ∧ χ).
Suppose ϕ := ¬(ψ∧χ). Then since the tableau commencing with ¬¬(ψ∧χ) is closed,
it can be seen that for some ζ ∈ {ψ,χ}, ρT ab(¬¬(ψ ∧ χ)) ≥ ρT ab(¬¬ζ ) + 1. It is here
that we require the restriction on the closure conditions in the standard tableau.17 Without
loss of generality, suppose ψ is such a ζ . Then using the induction hypothesis, we see that
ρT ab(¬¬(ψ ∧ χ)) + 1 ≥ (ρT ab(¬¬ψ) + 1) + 1
≥ ρ(¬ψ) + 1
≥ ρ(¬(ψ ∧ χ)).
Suppose ϕ := ∀xψ(x). Then using the induction hypothesis we see that
ρT ab(¬∀xψ(x)) + 1 = sup{ρT ab(¬ψ(n)) + 1 | n ∈ ω} + 1
≥ sup{ρ(¬ψ(n)) | n ∈ ω} + 1
= ρ(∀xψ(x) | n ∈ ω}.
Suppose ϕ := ¬∀xψ(x). Then since the tableau commencing with ¬¬∀xψ(x) is closed,
it can be seen that there is some n ∈ ω such that ρT ab(¬¬∀xψ(x)) ≥ ρT ab(¬¬ψ(n))+ 1.
Fix such an n. Then using the induction hypothesis we have:
ρT ab(¬¬∀xψ(x)) + 1 ≥ (ρT ab(¬¬ψ(n)) + 1) + 1
≥ ρ(¬ψ(n)) + 1
≥ ρ(¬∀xψ(x)).
Suppose ϕ := T ψ. Then
ρT ab(¬T ψ) + 1 = (ρT ab(¬ψ) + 1) + 1
≥ ρ(ψ) + 1
= ρ(T ψ).
17 To see why this is the case, let ϕ be the sentence 0 = 1 ∧ 0 = 1 and consider the tableaux for
ϕ∧¬ϕ which respectively do and do not include the inconsistency closure rule. With the rule, the
former tableau has rank 3; but without that closure rule, the other tableau has rank 5 (assuming
the obvious ordering of moves). However, the tableau for the first conjunct ϕ has rank 3; thus,
with the inconsistency closure condition the claim above is violated. We leave it to the reader to
satisfy themselves that the standard tableau - which omits this closure condition - satisfies the
claim. Similar remarks apply to the ¬∀ case.
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Suppose ϕ := ¬T ψ. Then
ρT ab(¬¬T ψ) + 1 = (ρT ab(¬¬ψ) + 1) + 1
≥ ρ(¬ψ) + 1
= ρ(¬T ψ).
(2.) By induction on -rank. We suppose that for all β ≤ α if ψ ∈ β+1\β , then
ψ ∈ 	+β+1. We then suppose that ϕ ∈ α+1\α . We must show that ϕ ∈ 	+α+1. It will
suffice to consider the ways that ϕ could have entered α+1.
(¬¬) Suppose that ϕ := ¬¬ψ . Then we can see that it must be the case that ψ ∈
γ+1\γ where α = γ +1.18 Then by induction hypothesis, we see that ψ ∈ 	+γ+1. Thus
V al	γ (ψ) = V al	γ (¬¬ψ) = 1; and so (¬¬ψ) ∈ 	+γ+1 ⊆ 	+α+1.
The other logical cases are similar, so we conclude by looking at the truth cases.
(T ) Suppose ϕ := T ψ. Then it must be the case that ψ ∈ γ+1\γ where α = γ +1.
Then by induction hypothesis, we see that ψ ∈ 	+γ+1. Thus, V al	γ+1(T ψ) = 1; and so
(T ψ) ∈ 	+γ+2 = 	+α+1.
(¬T ) Suppose ϕ := ¬T ψ. Then it must be the case that (¬ψ) ∈ γ+1\γ where
α = γ + 1. By induction, we see that (¬ψ) ∈ 	+γ+1 and so it can be seen that ψ ∈ 	−γ+1.
Thus, V al	γ+1(T ψ) = 0, which means that V al	γ+1(¬T ψ) = 1; and so, (¬T ψ) ∈
	+γ+2 = 	+α+1. 
This gives us an upper bound on the strong Kleene fixed point.
COROLLARY 5.19. The height of the strong Kleene fixed point is ≤ ωC K1 .
Proof. By Lemma 5.18, we see that the 	-rank of any sentence ϕ ∈ 	+SK is less than
its tableau-rank +1. Since Lemma 5.16 and Fact 5.10 tell us that the tableau ranks are
bounded by a limit ordinal ωC K1 , the result follows. 
Finally, we need to show that the recursive ordinals are exhausted by the 	-ranks of
sentences. To do this we introduce a bridging tableau for the strong Kleene system. We
introduce this for similar reasons as we did in the equivalence proofs for the supervaluation
systems. The bridging tableau allows us to cordon off that part of an ordinary tableau which
takes us up to the first application of the truth rules. With this in hand, we have something
much closer to Kripke’s original jump function and a useful tool for the execution of the
inductive proofs that follow. The system is very similar to the van Fraassen bridging tableau
except that we introduce a new predicate U to the language.
5.2.1. Starting conditions (sK ). To attempt to show that  sK χ , we commence
the tableau by placing ¬χ at the root.
5.2.2. Rules (sK ). We take the rules (∧), (¬∧), (¬¬), (∀) and (¬∀). These are just
the connective rules and quantifier rules from Section 2.2.2.
In place of the truth rules, we add the following axiom rules. Given a set of axioms 
we may apply either of the rules below at any point in the construction of a branch.
(AxU )
Uϕ
(Ax¬U )
¬Uϕ
where ϕ ∈ + where ϕ ∈ −
18 Note that α could not be a limit ordinal since nothing new is added in the limit stages of the 
construction.
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REMARK 5.20. We might think of this new predicate U as the official truth, while T is
merely provisional. This allows us to avoid problems with pathological sentences like the
liar sentence.
5.2.3. Closing conditions (sK ). A branch B closes if either:
• for some sentence ϕ, ¬T ϕ and its negation Uϕ occurs on B;
• for some sentence ϕ, T ϕ and its negation ¬Uϕ occurs on B;
• for some sentence ϕ, Uϕ and its negation ¬Uϕ occurs on B; or
• a false arithmetic sentence occurs on B.
If all of the branches in the tableau commencing with ¬ψ and axioms 〈+,−〉 close,
then the tableau is closed and we write 〈+,−〉 sK ψ .
LEMMA 5.21. 〈+,−〉 sK ψ iff V al〈+,−〉(ψ) = 1.
REMARK. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 3.7, although care needs to be
taken to deal with the cases when the valuation function is undefined.
LEMMA 5.22. For any recursive tree S ⊆ ω<ω there is a sentence ϕ ∈ SentLT whose
	-rank is greater than or equal to the tree-rank of S.
Proof. Let S† = {(0, m¯) | m¯ ∈ S} and ψS(n, m) be as described in Definition 5.8; and let
T be the canonical tableau commencing with ¬ψS(0, 〈〉). We first claim that the ψS(0, 〈〉)
has 	-rank greater than or equal to the truth rank of T .
Before we commence the main business of the proof, we make a couple of useful
observations about the canonical tableau. It should be clear that every sentence that appears
in the tableau appears only once. Thus, we may abuse our rank notation and consider the
truth-rank of sentences in T rather than the truth-ranks of finite sequences of sentences.
We shall thus write ρTT (ψS) to mean the truth-rank of ψ in the tableau T .
We also note that the canonical tableau T1 for ¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉) is
exactly the same as that part of the canonical tableau T2 for
¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p〉)
which proceeds from the point ¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉) occurring in T2. We
assume that ¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉) occurs in T2; i.e., the branch has not closed
before it gets the chance to be added. Moreover, it can easily be seen that
¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉)
has the same truth-rank regardless of which tableau we calculate it in; i.e.,
ρ
T1
T (¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉)) = ρT2T (¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉)).
We can thus ignore the tableau superscripts and just write ρT (¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p,
n1, . . . , nk〉)) for sentences of the form ¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉) to mean
ρTT (¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉)) for some canonical tableau T in which¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , m p, n1, . . . , nk〉) occurs.
We now proceed to establish the lemma by induction on truth-rank. Suppose that for all
sequences (n1, . . . , nk) ∈ ω<ω and for all β < α, if
ρT (¬ψS(0, 〈n1, . . . , nk〉)) = β,
then
ρT (¬ψS(0, 〈n1, . . . , nk〉)) ≤ ρ	(ψS(0, 〈n1, . . . , nk〉)).
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Now suppose that ρT (¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉)) = α. Let T † be the closed canonical tableau
commencing with ¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉) with truth rank α. We establish that the induction
hypothesis also holds for ¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉). Let
D+ = {ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml , i〉) | i ∈ ω}.
Then clearly, D+ is the ⊆-minimal set of sentences such that 〈D+,∅〉 sK
ψS(0, 〈m1, . . , ml〉). Then for all δ ∈ D+ we have ρT (¬δ) = β < α for some β;
and by induction, we have ρT (¬δ) ≤ ρ	(δ). Let γ = sup(ρ	“D+) = sup{ρ	(ψS(0,
〈m1, . . . , ml , i〉)) | i ∈ ω}. Then
ρT (¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉)) = sup({ρT (¬ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml , i〉)) + 1 | i ∈ ω})
≤ sup({ρ	(ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml , i〉)) + 1 | i ∈ ω})
≤ sup({ρ	(ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml , i〉)) | i ∈ ω}) + 1
= γ + 1.
It will suffice to show that ρ	(ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉)) = γ + 1. It can be seen that
D+ ⊆ 	+γ but D+ ⊆ 	+ξ for any ξ < γ . From the first of these facts we see that
〈	+γ , 	−γ 〉 sK ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉); and by Lemma 5.21, V al	γ (ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉)) =
1; so ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉) ∈ 	+γ+1. We then claim that
ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉) /∈ 	+γ .
Suppose not. Then for some ζ < γ , ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉) ∈ 	+ζ+1. Then by Lemma 5.21,
we see that 〈	+ζ , 	−ζ 〉 sK ψS(0, 〈m1, . . . , ml〉); but then D+ ⊆ 	+ξ ⊆ 	+γ contradicting
the minimality of γ .
We have now shown that the 	-rank of ψS(0, 〈〉) is greater than or equal to the truth
rank of ¬ψS(0, 〈〉). But from the proof of Lemma 5.15 it can be seen that the truth rank of
¬ψS(0, 〈〉) is equal to the tree-rank of S. 
COROLLARY 5.23. The height of the strong Kleene fixed point is ωC K1 .
Proof. (Upper bound) By Corollary 5.19. (Lower bound) By Lemma 5.22, we see that
the 	-ranks of sentences from SentLT exhaust the recursive ordinals. 
§6. Conclusion. We have provided simple infinitary tableau systems for the minimal
fixed points based on the strong Kleene, van Fraassen supervaluation and Cantini superval-
uation schemes. Moreover, we have indicated how modifications may be made so that other
semantic truth definitions may also be given proof systems. We have used this approach
to provide a simple proof of the complexity of these definitions and a direct proof that
that closure ordinal of Kripke’s strong Kleene definition is ωC K1 . In the future, it is hoped
that these techniques may be useful in the provision of consistency proofs for axiomatic
theories and logics of truth and as a guide for the development of new axiomatic theories.
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